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a b s t r a c t
The financial industry is seeing rapid introduction of new technologies and new business models that are
challenging established practices. Recent changes in financial regulation in the United States have
spurred evolution of equity crowdfunding as a potential alternative to traditional sources of venture capital. To address the relative lack of knowledge about success factors, we focus on Title III equity crowdfunding platforms in the United States that are open to non-accredited investors. We draw on traditional
venture finance research and we examine the effects of market, execution and agency risks in equity
crowdfunding under Title III. We collect data on 133 ventures that attracted more than $11 million in
funding commitments across sixteen Title III equity crowdfunding platforms. We find that all three types
of risks can affect the likelihood of successful fundraising under Title III. We discuss the implications of
these findings for entrepreneurs, investors, crowdfunding platforms and policy makers.
Ó 2017 Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved.

1. introduction
Continuous evolution of technology provides innovation opportunities across different sectors of the economy (Kauffman et al.,
2017). The finance industry has often been at the forefront of introducing new technologies to reduce friction in commercial transactions and generate new business opportunities. For example,
introduction of cashless payment methods in developing economies has been shown to promote the volume of transactions
(Runnemark et al., 2015). The Internet has become an effective
platform to support innovation in different types of traditional
banking activities. For example, Internet-mediated peer-to-peer
lending has rapidly grown into a multibillion dollar industry globally (Chen et al., 2016) and Internet-based cryptocurrencies are
promising to offer a decentralized alternative to traditional value
store systems (Alabi, 2017). In this study, we focus on the innovation in entrepreneurial venture fundraising in the United States.
More specifically, we examine the success factors associated with
venture fundraising via equity crowdfunding under Title III of the
JOBS Act in the United States.
Equity crowdfunding refers to the process of raising funds for
entrepreneurial ventures, typically via Internet-based platforms,
whereby investors receive equity in exchange for capital (SEC,
2016). Equity crowdfunding is distinct from reward-based crowdfunding. In reward-based crowdfunding, project backers provide
⇑ Corresponding author.
E-mail addresses: stanislav.mamonov@montclair.edu (S. Mamonov), ross.
malaga@montclair.edu (R. Malaga).
https://doi.org/10.1016/j.elerap.2017.12.001
1567-4223/Ó 2017 Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved.

funds to early stage entrepreneurial projects, typically in exchange
for a discount on the planned product, but receive no equity in the
project. For example, Oculus Rift raised over $2.4 million on Kickstarter (Gleasure and Feller, 2016), a reward-based crowdfunding
platform, through pre-orders for the virtual reality headset, but
the individual backers received no equity in the company and they
did not benefit from the $2.3 billion acquisition of the company by
Facebook (Constine, 2014).
Equity crowdfunding was explicitly prohibited in the United
States prior to the passage of the JOBS Act in 2012 (SEC,
2015a). The JOBS Act sought to make it easier for entrepreneurs
to raise funding and it contains several provisions. Title II of the
JOBS Act became effective in 2013 and it relaxed the rules concerning public investment solicitation from accredited investors
(SEC, 2015b). Accredited investors are individuals who either
have income exceeding $200,000 per year or have at least $1 million in assets, excluding the primary residence (SEC, 2013). Preliminary research on Title II equity crowdfunding shows that
over $1.26 billion have been committed by accredited investors
to Title II projects (Mamonov et al., 2017), however, much less
is known about Title III.
Title III of the JOBS Act expanded permissible equity crowdfunding to include the general public (Ivanov and Knyazeva,
2017). Title III allows companies to raise up to $1 million from
accredited and non-accredited investors over a 12-month period.
It allows individual non-accredited investors to commit up to
$2,000 a year to equity crowdfunded projects if the person’s
income is less than $100,000 a year and up to $10,000 if the
person’s income is above $100,000 (Ivanov and Knyazeva, 2017).
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Investor participation in early-stage venture financing exposes
the investors to many risks (Siegel, 2013). Concerns about individual non-accredited investor protections delayed the implementation of Title III provisions until May 2016 (Ivanov and Knyazeva,
2017). A theoretical evaluation of Title III legislation suggested that
Title III would likely fail due to information asymmetry and
adverse selection problems (Catalini et al., 2016), yet little is
known about the actual state of affairs across Title III equity crowdfunding platforms. This is the research gap that we begin to
address in the present study.
Title III equity crowdfunding is open to both accredited and
non-accredited investors. Prior research on crowdfunding has
shown that less experienced investors often follow the lead of
more experienced professional investors (Kim and Viswanathan,
2014). We draw on prior research on factors that are commonly
considered by accredited investors in potential offline investment
opportunity evaluation (Carpentier and Suret, 2015) and we examine the effects of market, execution and agency risks on venture
fundraising success in Title III equity crowdfunding. We analyze
133 projects across sixteen Title III equity crowdfunding platforms
that sought to raise funding in the period between May 2016 and
February 2017. In addition to providing empirical evidence that
entrepreneurial ventures can be successful in raising funds under
Title III, our results reveal that all three types of risks can affect
the success of fundraising in Title III platforms.
The remainder of the manuscript is structured as follows. First,
we provide an overview of prior research on equity crowdfunding.
Next, we draw on research in risk capital investments and we
develop the research framework in our study. We then describe
the data and our analytical methodology, and we present the
results. We conclude with a discussion of emergent insights and
implications of our findings for entrepreneurs, investors, crowdfunding platforms and policy makers.

2. Equity crowdfunding literature review
Equity crowdfunding is distinct from other types of crowdfunding that exist, in that it allows backers to receive an equity stake
in the company. Generally, four types of crowdfunding are recognized: reward-based, equity-based, loan-based, and donation-based.
Reward-based crowdfunding allows entrepreneurs to raise funding
by enabling project backers to pre-order a product or service that is
being developed (Kim et al., 2017). Reward-based crowdfunding
has always been legal in the United States. Joseph Pulitzer, the
publisher of New York World, led a crowdfunding campaign to build
the pedestal for the Statue of Liberty, and successfully raised funding from 160,000 contributors in 1885 (National Park Service,
2016). Because the campaign initiated by Joseph Pulitzer offered
tangible rewards to the participants – the Statue of Liberty would
be available for viewing and the top contributions were incentivized by the inclusion of the contributors’ names on the memorial plaque on the pedestal, this campaign is generally discussed
as an early example of reward-based crowdfunding.
IndieGogo and KickStarter were among the first platforms to
leverage the Internet to expand the reach of reward-based crowdfunding, and they have brokered over $3 billion in funding commitments since launch (KickStarter, 2017). There is an active
stream of research exploring factors that affect the success of projects hosted on the reward-based platforms (Kim et al., 2017;
Mollick, 2014; Mollick and Nanda, 2016; Ryu and Kim, 2016).
However, these studies do not necessarily yield useful insights
for equity-based crowdfunding, because investor motivations for
participation in equity-based crowdfunding platforms are very different from backers in reward-based crowdfunding (Belleflamme
et al., 2014). Equity investors are typically motivated by the

expected gains in the value of their investments, as opposed to
receiving a product or service from a reward-based project.
Loan-based lending, also known as peer-to-peer (P2P) lending is
the third type of crowdfunding (Zhang and Chen, 2017). Platforms
that facilitate P2P lending, such as LendingClub, typically perform
credit risk assessment on the requests for unsecured personal
loans and they connect borrowers with potential lenders (Chen
et al., 2016). The key difference between loan-based and equitybased crowdfunding is the risk/reward profile of the participating
investors. P2P lending typically involves relatively short-term
loans (6–36 months), with a clearly defined interest rate that is
set at the time of loan origination. Equity-based crowdfunding
exposes the investors to much greater uncertainty in terms of both
the time horizon for realizing a return on the investment, as well
the likelihood of earning a financial return. Research on earlystage venture investments suggests that it commonly takes 5–8
years for the investors in early-stage entrepreneurial ventures to
achieve liquidity and more than half of the investments in earlystage ventures result in a loss of the invested capital (Mason and
Harrison, 2008).
Whereas the participation in equity, rewards, and loan-based
crowdfunding is typically motivated by self-interest (Belleflamme
et al., 2014), there are also crowdfunding platforms, such as Kiva.
org, that facilitate philanthropic activities. Donors on the Kiva platform provide funds to support entrepreneurs in developing countries. This activity is primarily altruistic – the donors have no
financial incentives to participate on the platform (Gleasure and
Feller, 2016). Table 1 summarizes the key differences between different types of crowdfunding.
While equity crowdfunding is a relatively recent phenomenon
in the United States, a number of other countries have had a head
start. Equity crowdfunding has always been legal in Australia and
the Australian Small Scale Offering Board (ASSOB) has helped
entrepreneurs raise over $146 million since its launch in 2005
(ASSOB, 2017). Ahlers et al. (2015) examined factors that influence
equity crowdfunding success on ASSOB. The authors found that
provision of financial projections by the entrepreneurs and a
greater share of equity being retained by the entrepreneurs were
positively associated with crowdfunding success.
Equity crowdfunding regulation has advanced rapidly in Europe
and each country in the European Union has at least one equity
crowdfunding platform (CrowdfundingHub, 2016). Several studies
have explored factors that can affect the success of equity crowdfunding on the European platforms. Lukkarinen et al. (2016) examined an equity crowdfunding platform in Finland and found that
the size of the entrepreneurs’ social networks had a positive effect
on the likelihood of successful fundraising, while the minimum
investment amount required from each potential investor had a
negative effect on the likelihood of success. Vismara (2016a,
2016b) explored success factors on Crowdcube, an equity crowdfunding platform based in the United Kingdom, and found that
social connections, equity retention and engagement of professional investors were positively associated with successful campaigns. Professional investor involvement was also identified as
an important factor by Ralcheva and Roosenboom (2016) who also
studied Crowdcube.
Focusing on equity crowdfunding in the United States, Agrawal
et al. (2013) presented a theoretical analysis highlighting the
potential for the crowdfunding platforms to amplify information
asymmetries that commonly exist in early-stage ventures. Entrepreneurs typically know more about the prospects of a business
venture than the potential investors and the information asymmetry presents a challenge in the evaluation of investment opportunities. However, in a subsequent study, the authors found that angel
investors often pool their resources and form syndicates, wherein a
well-known investor takes the lead role in performing the due

67

S. Mamonov, R. Malaga / Electronic Commerce Research and Applications 27 (2018) 65–73
Table 1
Capital provider motivations, risks and liquidity horizons across crowdfunding categories.

Capital provider motivation
Risks
Liquidity horizon

Donation-based CF

Reward-based CF

Loan-based CF

Equity-based CF

Altruism
None
Not applicable

Product or service
Product or service not delivered
Not applicable

Earned interest
Loss of principal
6–36 months

Equity appreciation
Loss of investment
5–8 years

diligence on potential investments, thus providing a solution to the
information asymmetry challenges (Agrawal et al., 2014). Focusing
on Title II equity crowdfunding platforms, Mamonov et al. (2017)
showed that real estate projects are particularly successful in raising funding from the accredited investors under Title II. Table 2
summarizes the insights of empirical studies that examined equity
crowdfunding in different geographies.

3. Research framework and hypotheses
The goal of the present study is to understand factors that can
impact the success of equity crowdfunding under Title III in the
United States. Title III equity crowdfunding is open to both accredited and non-accredited investors. While little is known about the
criteria that may influence non-accredited investor decision making in this context, research has suggested that faced with the
uncertainty of investment decisions, less knowledgeable investors
often take their cues from experts (Kim and Viswanathan, 2014).
We expect that in Title III equity crowdfunding less sophisticated
investors will follow the lead of business angels (accredited investors) who are also active in Title III equity crowdfunding platforms.
Hence, we draw on research focusing on business angel investor
decision making to develop the theoretical framework in our study.
Research has shown that investors in informal risk capital markets focus on risks that fall into three general categories: market
risk, execution risk and agency risk (Carpentier and Suret, 2015).
Market risk is the risk of losing money on an investment due to
overall market factors. Examples of market factors include competition, growth potential, recession and political turmoil. Many of
these risks are external to the venture and outside the entrepreneur’s control. However, prior research has shown that market risk
is the top reason why professional angel investor groups reject an
investment (Carpentier and Suret, 2015; Maxwell et al., 2011).
When analyzing market risk, investors typically consider the stage

Table 2
Empirical studies in equity crowdfunding.
Authors/Context

Insights

Ahlers et al. (2015) Australian
Small Scale Offering Board

Provision of financial projections and
entrepreneurs retaining greater equity
percentage are associated with successful
fundraising.
The size of the minimum investment
(negative effect) and early finding from
entrepreneurs’ private networks are
associated with successful fundraising.
Equity retention and number of social
connections in social networking sites are
predictive of funding success.
Engagement of well-known investors has
a positive effect on project success.
Professional investor involvement and
patents are associated with success.
Syndicate driven investments dominate
the angel investor oriented equity
crowdfunding platform.
Real estate investments are
disproportionately more successful in
Title II crowdfunding.

Lukkarinen et al. (2016) Finland

Vismara (2016a) Crowdcube, UK

Vismara (2016b) Crowdcube, UK
Ralcheva and Roosenboom
(2016) Crowdcube, UK
Agrawal et al. (2014) Angel.co –
Title II equity crowdfunding
Mamonov et al. (2017) Title II
equity crowdfunding platforms

of the venture in question. Market risk is reduced as the venture
proceeds from idea/concept to prototype to actual sales.
A venture that is just in the idea or concept phase has the most
market risk because its market potential has not been proven. As
the venture moves from the idea or concept stage to the prototype
or minimal viable product stage some uncertainty about the product is removed. However, the market risk still remains high.
A venture needs to show that its product/service can succeed in
the market. It can accomplish this by selling its product/service
directly to consumers for a business-to-consumer (B2C) venture or
signing corporate customers for a business-to-business (B2B) venture (Feld and Mendelson, 2016). Successful consumer product
launches and signings of marquee corporate clients are commonly
interpreted by risk capital investors as market validation (Maxwell
et al., 2011) and we expect a similar behavior among the investors
in the context of equity crowdfunding platforms.
 Hypothesis 1a (The Completed Product or Service Development Hypothesis). Ventures that completed product or service
development are more likely to raise funding in online equity
crowdfunding campaigns than early-stage ventures (ideas or
prototypes).
 Hypothesis 1b (The Ventures with Large Corporate Clients
Hypothesis). Ventures that have large corporate clients are more
likely to raise funding in online equity crowdfunding campaigns
than ventures lacking such clients.
Prior research has shown that investors consider whether the
venture represents a disruptive or incremental innovation as a criterion for providing funding (Metrick and Yasuda, 2010). Startups
that offer only incremental innovations are unlikely to succeed in
competition with established incumbents. This is due to the fact
that incumbents typically have greater resources (i.e., financial,
marketing, R&D, etc.) than startups and can react aggressively to
incremental innovation. For example, the incumbent can accelerate their R&D cycle to develop and market a similar or superior
incremental innovation (Echambadi et al., 2008; Markman and
Waldron, 2014).
Startups based on a disruptive innovation are more likely to
attract funding (Christensen et al., 2002). While not a perfect proxy
for disruptive innovation, patents provide strong evidence of significant practical innovation (Häussler et al., 2013). Patents also
provide protection for startups from potential imitation by incumbents and thus they can offer a source of sustainable competitive
advantage.
 Hypothesis 2 (The Venture Holding Patents Hypothesis). Ventures that hold patents are more likely to raise funding in online
equity crowdfunding campaigns than ventures that do not have
patents.
Execution risk is the risk that a venture’s business plans will not
succeed in the market. In order to execute their plans successfully,
startup ventures require a diverse portfolio of skills, such as product development, marketing, operations, financial management,
etc. (Lazear, 2004). No individual entrepreneur is likely to possess
all of the skills required to make the venture a success. Prior
research indicates that venture capitalists are more likely to invest
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in startup teams over single entrepreneurs (Hsu, 2007). In addition,
venture capitalists prefer teams that are comprised of both young
entrepreneurs with new ideas and more seasoned executives who
can guide the venture to successful execution of its plans.
Research has shown that angel investors consider an entrepreneur’s prior industry experience and prior entrepreneurial experience when deciding whether to invest (Maxwell et al., 2011).
Potential investors value prior entrepreneurial experience due to
the fact that in order to realize financial reward from an earlystage investment the venture must have an ‘‘exit” (buyout or public offering). Entrepreneurs who have had previous successful exits
understand the expectations of investors and have shown their
ability to deliver financial rewards.
 Hypothesis 3a (The Single Entrepreneur Hypothesis). Single
entrepreneurs are less likely to successfully raise funding in
online equity crowdfunding campaigns than entrepreneurial
teams comprised of 2 or more members.
 Hypothesis 3b (The Serial Entrepreneur Hypothesis). Serial
entrepreneurs are more likely to successfully raise funding in
online equity crowdfunding campaigns.
 Hypothesis 3c (The Experienced Entrepreneur Hypothesis).
Entrepreneurs with prior experience in the target industry are
more likely to raise funding in online equity crowdfunding
campaigns.
 Hypothesis 3d (The Larger Entrepreneurial Teams Hypothesis). Larger entrepreneurial teams are more likely to successfully raise funding in online equity crowdfunding campaigns.
The information asymmetry between the entrepreneurs and
potential investors leads to agency risk. Entrepreneurs know more
about their business than potential investors. This can result in
opportunism which is more common among younger, smaller
firms (NOE and Rebello, 1996). Angel investors typically mitigate
the agency risk by close involvement in the entrepreneurial ventures in which they invest. However, online platform-mediated
investments allow for more geographically-distant investments
which make active angel investor engagement in the entrepreneurial ventures very challenging (Morrissette, 2007). In these
cases, potential investors may rely on another angel investor or
VC firm to take a lead role in closely monitoring the venture.
Research conducted on the angel-oriented, equity crowdfunding
platform Angel.co has shown that successful fundraising is
dominated by syndicate-based investments. In this structure a
well-known angel investor or VC takes the lead role – providing
due diligence and close monitoring (Agrawal et al., 2014).
Therefore, we anticipate that companies that have funding from
an experienced angel or VC are more likely to attract further
funding from investors on equity crowdfunding platforms.
 Hypothesis 4a (The Venture with Established Angel Investors
Hypothesis). Ventures that have already attracted funding from
established angel investors would be more likely to successfully
raise funding in online equity crowdfunding campaigns.
 Hypothesis 4b (The Venture with Professional Venture Capital Firms Investors Hypothesis). Ventures that have already
attracted funding from professional venture capital firms would
be more likely to successfully raise funding in online equity
crowdfunding campaigns.
Characteristics of the entrepreneur have been shown to be an
important screening factor for angel and VC investors (Chen
et al., 2009). For example, prior research has noted the importance
of entrepreneurial passion and determination as well as trustworthiness in successful venture fundraising (Murnieks et al., 2016).
Entrepreneurs that do not show passion and determination

undermine investor confidence that the entrepreneur can overcome
the many challenges faced in shepherding a venture to success
and then an exit. Investors also want to feel that the entrepreneur
will be a trustworthy steward of any money invested (Maxwell
et al., 2011). Entrepreneurs may find it challenging to communicate
their various positive characteristics to investors in a computermediated context. Prior research in reward-based crowdfunding
has shown that video is an important communication tool in
computer-mediated communication (Mollick, 2014). We expect
that successful entrepreneurs will make use of video in communicating with potential investors in equity crowdfunding platforms.
 Hypothesis 5a (The Project Descriptions Video Hypothesis).
Ventures that use video in their project descriptions will be
more likely to successfully raise funding in online equity crowdfunding campaigns.
 Hypothesis 5b (The Project Founders Video Hypothesis). Ventures that use video featuring the founders in their project
descriptions will be more likely to successfully raise funding
in online equity crowdfunding campaigns.
4. Data and methodology
We obtained the dataset for our study by collecting projectlevel details across sixteen known Title III equity crowdfunding
platforms. We acquired project descriptions as well as the information about the amount of capital sought and funds committed by
the investors to each project. Appendix 2 provides a summary of
the number of projects and total capital commitments for each of
the platforms in our dataset.
Project success is the dependent variable in our study. Following the accepted practice (Ahlers et al., 2015), we defined project
success as a venture raising the minimum amount of capital that
was sought. 69 of 133 (51.9%) projects in our dataset were successful in achieving their funding goals.
We engaged two graduate assistants with experience in
entrepreneurship and equity crowdfunding to review the project
descriptions and code the data. The coders met with the authors
to resolve coding differences. Table 3 summarizes the independent
variable and co-variate coding schema and it also provides the
descriptive statistics for the data in our study.

Table 3
Variable coding schema and descriptive statistics.
Variable name/Coding schema

Descriptive statistics

Single_entrepreneur

21.8% of ventures were led by a single
entrepreneur
95.5% of ventures had founders with
experience in target industry
9% of ventures were led by serial
entrepreneurs

Industry_experience
Serial_entrepreneur. At least one
founder had prior entrepreneurial
experience.
Team_size. Number people in
venture.
Venture_stage
Angel_investors
VC_investment
Video
Entrepreneur_video
Patents_issued
Minimum issue amount

Min = 1; max = 22; average = 3.9; st.
dev = 2.5
Idea = 5; beta = 65; product = 63
19.5% of ventures received funding
from pro angel investors
18% ventures received funding from
VC investors
84.9% of the venture funding
solicitations included a video
60.15% of solicitations included a
video featuring the founder(s)
12.8% of ventures had obtained
patents
Min: $10,000; max: $15 mil; average:
$349,307; most common value:
$100,000; st. dev.: $1.3 mil
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To assess the effects of the independent variables on project
equity crowdfunding success we ran a series of logistic regression
models. We relied on SPSS Version 22 to conduct the analysis. In
the next section, we discuss the results.
5. Results
The results of our research are summarized in Table 4 below.
In the first step of our analysis, we examined the separate
effects of market, execution, agency and computer-mediation on
the likelihood of venture success in raising funding in online Title
III equity crowdfunding platforms.
Focusing on the market risks, we found that the company development stage had an effect on the success of a crowdfunding campaign. Companies in the beta/prototype stage were less likely to
raise funding (43.1% success rate) than companies that completed
product development (65.1% success rate). None of the companies
in the ‘‘idea” stage were successful in raising the full target
amount. We also found a significant positive effect of a company
having corporate clients in its portfolio. 70.3% of B2B companies
with existing clients were successful in raising the full target
amount, whereas only 44.2% of the B2B companies with no mention of existing clients were successful in raising the full amount.
These results lend support for the Completed Product or Service
Development Hypothesis (H1a) and the Ventures with Large Corporate Clients Hypothesis (H1b). Although 12.9% of the companies
in our dataset held patents, we found no statistically significant

Table 4
Supported and Unsupported Hypotheses.
Supported Hypotheses
H1a. The Completed Product or Service Development Hypothesis. Ventures
that completed product or service development are more likely to raise
funding in online equity crowdfunding campaigns than early-stage
ventures (ideas or prototypes).
H1b. The Ventures with Large Corporate Clients Hypothesis. Ventures that
have large corporate clients are more likely to raise funding in online
equity crowdfunding campaigns than ventures lacking such clients.
H3a. The Single Entrepreneur Hypothesis. Single entrepreneurs are less
likely to successfully raise funding in online equity crowdfunding
campaigns than entrepreneurial teams comprised of 2 or more members.
H3d. The Larger Entrepreneurial Teams Hypothesis. Larger entrepreneurial
teams are more likely to successfully raise funding in online equity
crowdfunding campaigns.
H4a. The Venture with Established Angel Investors Hypothesis. Ventures
that have already attracted funding from established angel investors would
be more likely to successfully raise funding in online equity crowdfunding
campaigns.
H4b. The Venture with Professional Venture Capital Firms Investors
Hypothesis. Ventures that have already attracted funding from
professional venture capital firms would be more likely to successfully
raise funding in online equity crowdfunding campaigns.
Unsupported Hypotheses

Results

H2. The Venture Holding Patents
Hypothesis. Ventures that hold
patents are more likely to raise
funding in online equity
crowdfunding campaigns than
ventures that do not have patents.
H3b. The Serial Entrepreneur
Hypothesis. Serial entrepreneurs
are more likely to successfully
raise funding in online equity
crowdfunding campaigns.
H3c. The Experienced Entrepreneur
Hypothesis. Entrepreneurs with
prior experience in the target
industry are more likely to raise
funding in online equity
crowdfunding campaigns.

The venture holding a patent does
not seem to matter to equity
crowdfunding investors

Serial entrepreneurs do not appear to
be more successful in equity
crowdfunding

Experienced entrepreneurs do not
appear to be more successful in
equity crowdfunding

69

effects of the patents on the likelihood of successful equity crowdfunding. The Ventures Holding Patents Hypothesis (H2) was not
supported.
Focusing on the execution risks, we found a negative effect for
single-entrepreneur led ventures and a positive effect for the size
of the entrepreneurial team. Single entrepreneurs were successful
in raising the full amount 47.1% of the time, whereas larger entrepreneurial teams succeeded in 69% of the campaigns. These results
provide support for the Single Entrepreneur Hypothesis (H3a) and
the Larger Entrepreneurial Teams Hypothesis (H3d). We found no
support for the effects of prior industry experience or serial entrepreneurial experience on the success of equity crowdfunding in our
data. The Serial Entrepreneur Hypothesis (H3b) and the Experienced Entrepreneur Hypothesis (H3c) were not supported.
Next, we examined the effects of professional investor involvement in the mitigation of agency risks that commonly exist in
early-stage ventures. We found that when examined individually,
both professional angel investor involvement and venture capitalist participation had a positive effect on the success in equity
crowdfunding, however only VC participation was positively correlated with the likelihood of success in the model that included both
factors. 80.8% of ventures with well-known angel investors and
91.7% of the VC-backed ventures were successful in their equity
crowdfunding campaigns, compared to 42.6% success rate for ventures with no angel or VC backing. The results provide support for
the Venture with Established Angel Investors Hypothesis (H4a) and
the Venture with Professional Venture Capital Firms Investors
Hypothesis (H4b).
Finally, we assessed the full model that included market, execution and agency risks as well as the use of video to communicate
with the potential investors in equity crowdfunding platforms.
We found that in the full model the company stage, the size of
the entrepreneurial team, professional angel investor, and VC
involvement retained their effects on the success of equity crowdfunding under Title III. These results remain significant after controlling for the size of the investment required by the companies
and the month when the fundraising campaign was launched.
Those who want to see the detailed statistics from the study can
find them in Appendix 1.

6. Discussion and implications
6.1. Discussion
In this study, we argued that less sophisticated non-accredited
investors in Title III equity crowdfunding platforms would follow
the more sophisticated investors’ lead. We drew on the risk capital
framework and we evaluated the effects of market, execution and
agency risks that are commonly considered by professional angel
investors in traditional offline investments. Our results show that
all three types of risks have an effect on the likelihood of a successful equity crowdfunding campaign in online Title III equity crowdfunding platforms. However, not all variables that we examined
had an effect.
In terms of market risks, we found that ventures that progressed to the product/service stage were more likely to be successful in raising funding in Title III platforms. 65.1% of the
ventures in the product/service stage were successful, whereas
only 43.1% of the ventures in the beta/prototype stage were successful. None of the five ventures in the idea stage was successful
in achieving the funding goal. These results indicate that investors
in Title III platforms are willing to consider companies in the beta/
prototype stage of development, however, the companies that
progressed to the product/service stage are more likely to achieve
their funding goals. We also found that while patents had no
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Appendix 1
The effects of market, execution and agency risks in Title III equity crowdfunding.
Model 1: Market Risk
Company stage
Idea
Beta/prototype
Product
Corporate clients
Patents
Single entrepreneur
Serial entrepreneur
Industry experience
Team size
Angel investors
VC investors
Video
Entrepreneur in video
ln(Min issue amount)
Campaign start month
2 log likelihood
Cox and Snell R2
Nagelkerke R2

Model 2: Execution Risk

Model 3: Agency Risk

Full Model

ns
0.84*

ns
0.78*

0.88*
ns

1.05*
ns
1.26*
ns
ns
0.25*
0.98*
2.14*
ns
ns
0.89***
ns
113.2
0.408
0.537

1.15*
ns
ns
0.251*
ns
2.3**

164.2
0.14
0.19

168.2
0.106
0.141

158
0.178
0.238

Unobserved project-level heterogeneity is a common concern in panel data analysis (Mood, 2010). To assess the potential effects of unobserved heterogeneity we reanalyzed
the full model using the mixed logit technique which accounts for the potential subpopulations in the data (Hensher and Greene, 2003). The results of the mixed logit model
affirmed the effects of the company stage, corporate clients, entrepreneurial team size and single entrepreneur led ventures as well the involvement of professional angel
investors and venture capitalists on the success of equity crowdfunding under Title III.
*
p < .05.
***
p < .01.

Appendix 2
Title III equity crowdfunding platforms.
Platform

Number of projects

Total capital commitments

Crowdsourcefunded
Crudefunders.com
Dreamfunded.vc
Flashfunders.com
iBankers
Jumpstartmicro
Localstake
Netcapital
Nextseed.co
Republic
Seedinvest.com
Startengine.com
Trucrowd
uFundingportal
Centure.co
Wefunder

2
1
1
8
2
4
1
2
7
4
5
17
5
18
4
43

0
112,950
0
138,188
0
5,200
14,000
13,925
1,295,400
185,502
291,613
1,318,732
37,333
30
46,002
7,857,725

statistically significant effect on the likelihood of success, market
traction evidenced in a company having corporate customers had
a significant positive effect. 70.3% of companies that had corporate
customers were successful in raising funding in Title III platforms
that we examined.
Focusing on the execution risk, we found that single entrepreneur ventures were successful 47.1% of the time in reaching the
funding goal, whereas ventures with entrepreneurial teams were
successful 69% of the time. The importance of entrepreneurial
teams versus single entrepreneurs is consistent with the insights
from research on angel investor decision making (Carpentier and
Suret, 2015; Sudek, 2006), however, we found no support for prior
entrepreneurial experience or industry experience effects on
investment decisions.
In our evaluation of agency risks in Title III crowdfunding, we
focused on whether engagement of professional angel investors
and/or venture capitalists is associated with a higher probability
of successful equity crowdfunding. We found that both angel
investor and VC participation had significant effects. 80.8% of ventures that received funding from a prominent angel investor prior
to soliciting funding via equity crowdfunding were successful.

91.7% of companies that received funding from a venture capital
firm prior to the engagement in equity crowdfunding platforms
were successful in hitting their funding targets.
We also examined whether the use of video could help entrepreneurs overcome the challenges of communicating their passion
and commitment to the success of the ventures to potential investors. Contrary to results from reward-based crowdfunding
(Mollick, 2014), we found no effect for the use of video in investment solicitations.
To evaluate the robustness of our model, we examined the
effect of incorporating the funding goal amount and the month
in which the equity crowdfunding campaign was launched on
the likelihood of crowdfunding success as covariates in our model.
The effects of the key variables in our model remained significant
after the addition of these covariates to the model. Consistent with
prior research in equity crowdfunding (Vismara, 2016a), we found
a negative effect of the funding goal amount on the likelihood of a
campaign’s success in our data. Further examination of the data
revealed that 46 of 133 ventures (35.4%) sought to raise less than
$100,000 and 70% of these ventures were successful in raising
the target capital. Whereas ventures seeking more than $500,000
were successful only 33.4% of the time, and none of the ventures
that sought to raise over $1 million was successful.
In aggregate, our results suggest that investors in Title III
crowdfunding platforms generally share their approach to potential investment evaluation with professional angel investors
(Mamonov and Malaga, in press). We find that investors in these
platforms are perceptive to market, execution and agency risks.
The investors prefer to fund companies that are headed by entrepreneurial teams (as opposed to a single entrepreneur). The investors also prefer companies that completed product or service
development and are showing market traction by signing corporate customers. Our results also indicate that investors in Title III
equity crowdfunding platforms are looking for external validation
of the ventures seeking funding and management of agency risks in
the form of traditional angel investor or VC involvement. These
results imply that although Title III platforms are aimed at the less
sophisticated non-accredited investors, the apparent patterns of
investor decision making suggest that sophisticated investors play
a key role in influencing the success of individual campaigns.
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6.2. Practical implications
Our study makes a number of contributions to both theory and
practice. Our findings have practical implications for entrepreneurs
and as well as the broader fintech ecosystem (operators of crowdfunding platforms, policy makers, regulators, etc.). The empirical
insights emergent from our study suggest that Title III equity
crowdfunding platforms can be a source of early capital for entrepreneurial ventures, however the amount of available capital tends
to be relatively low – less than $1 million, and more commonly,
less than $300,000. Given the relatively low amount of capital that
can be raised in Title III platforms, these platforms are likely to be
supplementary sources of funding for entrepreneurs. In other
words, entrepreneurs seeking seed (typically $500,000 – $1 million) or series A (typically $1-$5 million) funding, would likely
need to engage with traditional angel investors as the primary
source of funds and then possibly augment the fundraising via a
Title III campaign.
These observations also have implications for the operators of
the Title III equity crowdfunding platforms. Provided that, at least
at the moment, Title III platforms would be unlikely to serve as a
singular source of seed or series A funds for new ventures, the platforms would benefit from close alignment with established angel
investors and early-stage venture capitalists in order to generate
deal flow and sustain interest from potential non-accredited investors. As we already noted, WeFunder, the most successful platform
in our dataset, emerged from Y Combinator, one of the best known
venture accelerator programs that has a strong VC network
(Lawler, 2013).
Equity crowdfunding remains a hotly debated policy topic and
Title III has received a fair share of criticism for coming up short
in solving the challenge of easier access to funding for entrepreneurial ventures while also assuring investor protection (Catalini
et al., 2016; Siegel, 2013). The results of our study indicate that
while Title III had a slower start compared to Title II (Mamonov
et al., 2017), legislation has been adopted in practice and Title III
equity crowdfunding platforms are gaining traction. These results
illustrate that regulatory changes can spurn novel entrepreneurial
fundraising channels that leverage online platforms. Online equitybased crowdfunding has the promise of democratizing access to
capital as well as access to investment opportunities and thus contribute to other developments in the Fintech Revolution (Kauffman
et al., 2017).
6.3. Theoretical contributions
Our first theoretical contribution is the adoption of the risk capital framework that was developed in the offline context
(Carpentier and Suret, 2015) for the analysis of factors that can
affect online venture equity crowdfunding success. The risk capital
framework complements signaling and social capital perspectives
that have been applied in studies of equity crowdfunding (Ahlers
et al., 2015; Vismara, 2016a). The risk perspective recognizes that
understanding how investors evaluate potential investment opportunities is critical to entrepreneurs securing an investment. The
risk perspective focuses on actual risk evaluation, whereas the signaling perspective addresses the question of how entrepreneurs
can signal the fitness of their ventures to potential investors. Actual
risks and what entrepreneurs may be able to signal to potential
investors are distinct and therefore there is a need to understand
the fundamental risks inherent to early-stage ventures and how
these risks affect investment decision in equity crowdfunding.
Our second theoretical contribution stems from provision of
empirical evidence that shows that investors in Title III equity
crowdfunding platform share their approach to investment evaluation with traditional offline business angel investors. These
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results suggest that while the Title III goal was to open access to
early-stage venture investments to non-accredited investors, it is
the sophisticated, and likely accredited, investors who play the
critical role in venture fundraising success under Title III. These
results contribute to the emerging stream of evidence on the
importance of experts in equity crowdfunding decisions (Kim
and Viswanathan, 2014) and suggest that such behavior may
reflect rational herding (Zhang and Liu, 2012), wherein less sophisticated investors follow the lead of the more experienced business
angels.
Our third theoretical contribution also stems from the implications of empirical results in our study. Our findings suggest that
professional business angels are the key participants in the online
equity crowdfunding platforms in the United States. The most successful equity crowdfunding platform in our dataset (WeFunder)
emerged from Y Combinator and draws on its venture investor network to generate deal flow (Lawler, 2013). The investment opportunities offered on the platform tend to be high growth potential
ventures. This is in contrast with successful equity crowdfunding
platforms in other countries. Microbreweries, for example, have
been a very successful category on Crowdcube in the UK (Evans,
2015), and farms offering delicious meet products have done well
in equity crowdfunding in Australia (Guenther et al., 2017). The
country and platform specific differences may account for the lack
of evidence in support for venture related factors in some studies
(Lukkarinen et al., 2016). Our results highlight the importance of
accounting for country specific contextual factors that may influence equity crowdfunding success and also examining the success
factors across different platforms within each country in order to
identify generalizable patterns.
6.4. Opportunity for future research
The results of our study point to a number of opportunities for
further research. While the capital risk framework has generally
proven its value in the Title III equity crowdfunding context in that
we found evidence supporting the effects of market, execution and
agency risks in this context, not all factors that we evaluated
showed statistically significant effects. We found no evidence to
support the effects of ventures holding patents, entrepreneurial
experience or serial entrepreneurship in our data. These variables
are firmly established as consideration criteria in investment
opportunity evaluation in traditional offline venture financing
(Carpentier and Suret, 2015) and it would be important to examine
the possible reasons why these factors maybe of lesser importance
in the online equity crowdfunding platforms.
There are also further opportunities to research the nuances of
the specific factors that we included in our study. For example,
venture capitalists are known to syndicate their investments
(Tian, 2011). This is typically done with the dual goal of improving
the due diligence process by engaging additional VCs in investment
opportunity evaluation (Casamatta and Haritchabalet, 2007) and
engaging other VCs in supporting venture development following
the investment (Tian, 2011). While we found no syndicated deals
in our dataset, it would be important to examine how investment
syndication can affect Title III equity crowdfunding success. Further, it would also be important to understand whether the mere
act of an investment by a venture capitalist is sufficient to power
a venture’s success in equity crowdfunding, or whether it is the
active engagement with the venture by a venture capitalist that
ultimately propels an entrepreneurial firm to success. In a related
vein of inquiry, it would be important to further explore the mechanisms underlying the effects of the size of the entrepreneurial
team on the success in equity crowdfunding. Prior literature has
noted that the size of entrepreneurial social networks can play a
role in reward-based crowdfunding (Butticè et al., 2017;
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Colombo et al., 2015). It would be of interest to examine whether
the larger entrepreneurial teams are simply engaging a larger
number of personal connections as potential investors or whether
the potential investors are focusing on the complementarity of
entrepreneurial team members’ skills in making the investment
decisions.
6.5. Concluding remarks
While we collected data across all known Title III equity crowdfunding platforms, our dataset contains only 133 venture listings.
However, our dataset does reflect the historical information that
is actually available to potential investors on Title III platforms
and 64 of 133 (48.1%) ventures did not reach the full target amount
affording us an opportunity to examine the factors associated with
fundraising success under Title III. Further research will be needed
to reevaluate the insights that emerged in our study as Title III
platforms continue to develop.
In conclusion, in this study we sought to address the lack of
knowledge on the success factors in equity crowdfunding open to
non-accredited investors in the United States under Title III of the
JOBS Act. We argued that because Title III platforms are open to
both non-accredited and accredited investors, the accredited
investors would lead the way and they would leverage established
practices in investment evaluation by examining market, execution and agency risks associated with early-stage venture investments. We examined the role of these factors using a dataset
collected across sixteen Title III equity crowdfunding platforms.
Our results indicate that investors in Title III platforms are cognizant of market, execution and agency risks, but they are also
selective in which factors they consider. We found that ventures
started by teams of entrepreneurs, which progressed to product/
service development, signed corporate clients, and received funding from professional investors were more likely to be successful
in raising funding in Title III equity crowdfunding platforms. The
results suggest that Title III platforms complement, rather than
replace the professional investor funding for entrepreneurial ventures. These findings contribute to the ongoing polemic on the role
of technology-enabled innovation and regulatory changes in the
financial sector (Liu et al., 2015) and illustrate the potential of
the equity crowdfunding platforms to democratize both venture
financing and access to early stage venture investments.
References
Agrawal, A., Catalini, C., Goldfarb, A., 2013. Some simple economics of
crowdfunding. National Bureau of Economic Research, Cambridge, MA.
Agrawal, A., Catalini, C., Goldfarb, A., 2014. Are syndicates the killer app of equity
crowdfunding? Calif. Manage. Rev. 58, 111–125.
Ahlers, G.K.C., Cumming, D., Günther, C., Schweizer, D., 2015. Signaling in equity
crowdfunding. Entrep. Theory Pract. 39, 955–980.
Alabi, K., 2017. Digital blockchain networks appear to be following Metcalfe’s Law.
Electron. Commer. Res. Appl. 24, 23–29.
ASSOB, 2017. About ASSOB [WWW Document]. URL https://assob.com.au/about.
asp?page=1.
Belleflamme, P., Lambert, T., Schwienbacher, A., 2014. Crowdfunding: Tapping the
right crowd. J. Bus. Ventur. 29, 585–609.
Butticè, V., Colombo, M.G., Wright, M., 2017. Serial crowdfunding, social capital, and
project success. Entrep. Theory Pract. 41, 183–207.
Carpentier, C., Suret, J.M., 2015. Angel group members’ decision process and
rejection criteria: A longitudinal analysis. J. Bus. Ventur. 30, 808–821.
Casamatta, C., Haritchabalet, C., 2007. Experience, screening and syndication in
venture capital investments. J. Financ. Intermediation 16, 368–398.
Catalini, C., Fazio, C., Murray, F., 2016. Can equity crowdfunding democratize access
to capital and investment opportunities? SSRN, 1–16.
Chen, X.-P., Yao, X., Kotha, S., 2009. Entrepreneur passion and preparedness in
business plan presentations: a persuasion analysis of venture capitalists’
funding decisions. Acad. Manag. J. 52, 199–214.
Chen, X., Zhou, L., Wan, D., 2016. Group social capital and lending outcomes in the
financial credit market: An empirical study of online peer-to-peer lending.
Electron. Commer. Res. Appl. 15, 1–13.

Christensen, C.M., Johnson, M.W., Rigby, D.K., 2002. Foundations for growth:
How to identify and build disruptive new businesses. MIT Sloan Manag. Rev.
43, 22.
Colombo, M.G., Franzoni, C., Rossi-Lamastra, C., 2015. Internal social capital and the
attraction of early contributions in crowdfunding. Entrep. Theory Pract. 39 (1),
75–100.
Constine, J., 2014. Facebook’s $2 billion acquisition of Oculus closes, now official.
Techcrunch, July 21. Available at: techcrunch.com/2014/07/21/facebooksacquisition-of-oculus-closes-now-official/
CrowdfundingHub, 2016. Current state of crowdfunding in Europe. Amsterdam,
Netherlands.
Echambadi, R., Bayus, B.L., Agarwal, R., 2008. Entry timing and the survival of
startup and incumbent firms in new industries. Working paper, University of
Illinois, Champaign.
Evans, J., 2015. Popular capitalism or the madness of crowds. Financ, Times, March,
p. 6.
Feld, B., Mendelson, J., 2016. Venture Deals: Be Smarter Than Your Lawyer and
Venture Capitalist. John Wiley & Sons, New York.
Gleasure, R., Feller, J., 2016. A rift in the ground: Theorizing the evolution of anchor
values in crowdfunding communities through the oculus rift case study. J.
Assoc. Inf. Syst. 17, 708–736.
Guenther, C., Johan, S., Schweizer, D., 2017. Is the crowd sensitive to
distance? How investment decisions differ by investor type. Small Bus.
Econ., 1–17
Häussler, C., Harhoff, D., Müller, E., 2013. To be financed or not ... The role of patents
for venture capital-financing. Working paper, Centre for European Economic
Research Discussion Paper No. 09-003, revised March 23.
Hensher, D.A., Greene, W.H., 2003. The mixed logit model: The state of practice.
Transportation 30 (2), 133–176.
Hsu, D.H., 2007. Experienced entrepreneurial founders, organizational capital, and
venture capital funding. Res. Policy 36, 722–741.
Ivanov, V., Knyazeva, A., 2017. U.S. securities-based crowdfunding under Title III of
the JOBS Act. White paper, Securities Exchange Commission, Washington, DC,
February 27.
Kauffman, R.J., Kim, K., Lee, S.Y.T., Hoang, A.P., Ren, J., 2017. Combining machinebased and econometrics methods for policy analytics insights. Electron.
Commer. Res. Appl. 25, 115–140.
KickStarter,, 2017. KickStarter statistics Available at www.kickstarter.com/help/
stats, .
Kim, K., Viswanathan, S., 2014. The experts in the crowd: The role of reputable
investors in a crowdfunding market, in: The 41st Research Conference on
Communication, Information and Internet Policy.
Kim, T., Por, M.H., Yang, S.-B., 2017. Winning the crowd in online fundraising
platforms: The roles of founder and project features. Electron. Commer. Res.
Appl. 25, 86–94.
Lawler, R., 2013. Y Combinator-backed WeFunder launches to bring crowdfunding
startups to the masses. Techcrunc, March 19. Available at techcrunch.com/
2013/03/19/wefunder-launch/.
Lazear, E.P., 2004. Balanced skills and entrepreneurship. Am. Econ. Rev. 94, 208–
211.
Liu, J., Kauffman, R.J., Ma, D., 2015. Competition, cooperation, and regulation:
Understanding the evolution of the mobile payments technology ecosystem.
Electron. Commer. Res. Appl. 14, 372–391.
Lukkarinen, A., Teich, J.E., Wallenius, H., Wallenius, J., 2016. Success drivers of online
equity crowdfunding campaigns. Decis. Support Syst. 87, 26–38.
Mamonov, S., Malaga, R., 2017. Success factors in Title II equity crowdfunding in the
United States. Cap, Ventur. in press.
Mamonov, S., Malaga, R., Rosenblum, J., 2017. An exploratory analysis of Title II
equity crowdfunding success. Ventur. Cap., 239–256
Markman, G.D., Waldron, T.L., 2014. Small entrants and large incumbents: A
framework of micro entry. Acad. Manag. Perspect. 28, 179–197.
Mason, C.M., Harrison, R.T., 2008. Measuring business angel investment activity in
the United Kingdom: A review of potential data sources. Ventur. Cap. 10, 309–
330.
Maxwell, A.L., Jeffrey, S.A., Lévesque, M., 2011. Business angel early stage decision
making. J. Bus. Ventur. 26, 212–225.
Metrick, A., Yasuda, A., 2010. Venture Capital and the Finance of Innovation. John
Wiley and Sons, New York.
Mollick, E., 2014. The dynamics of crowdfunding: An exploratory study. J. Bus.
Ventur. 29, 1–16.
Mollick, E., Nanda, R., 2016. Wisdom or madness? Comparing crowds with expert
evaluation in funding the arts. Manage. Sci. 62 (3), 1533–1553.
Mood, C., 2010. Logistic regression: Why we cannot do what we think we can do,
and what we can do about it. Eur. Sociol. Rev. 26, 67–82.
Morrissette, S.G., 2007. A profile of angel investors. J. Priv. Equity 10, 52–66.
Murnieks, C.Y., Cardon, M.S., Sudek, R., White, T.D., Brooks, W.T., 2016. Drawn to the
fire: The role of passion, tenacity and inspirational leadership in angel investing.
J. Bus. Ventur. 31, 468–484.
National Park Service, 2016. Joseph Pulitzer Available at: www.nps.gov/stli/learn/
historyculture/joseph-pulitzer.htm, .
Noe, T.H., Rebello, M.J., 1996. Asymmetric information, managerial opportunism,
financing, and payout policies. J. Finance 51, 637–660.
Ralcheva, A., Roosenboom, P., 2016. On the road to success in equity crowdfunding.
Available SSRN 2727742.
Runnemark, E., Hedman, J., Xiao, X., 2015. Do consumers pay more using debit cards
than cash? Electron. Commer. Res. Appl. 14, 285–291.

S. Mamonov, R. Malaga / Electronic Commerce Research and Applications 27 (2018) 65–73
Ryu, S., Kim, Y.G., 2016. A typology of crowdfunding sponsors: Birds of a feather
flock together? Electron. Commer. Res. Appl. 16, 43–54.
SEC, 2013. Investor bulletin: Accredited investors. SEC Office of Investor Education
and Advocacy, Washington, DC, September 23. Available at: www.investor.gov/
news-alerts/investor-bulletins/investor-bulletin-accredited-investors.
SEC, 2015a. Jumpstart Our Business Startups (JOBS) Act. Securities Exchange
Commission, Washington, DC. Available at: www.sec.gov/spotlight/jobs-act.
shtml.
SEC, 2015b. SEC adopts rules to permit crowdfunding. Securities Exchange
Commission, Washington, DC, October 30. Available at: www.sec.gov/
news/pressrelease/2015-249.html.
SEC, 2016. Investor bulletin: Crowdfunding for Investors. Invest. Alerts Bulletin,
Security Exchange Commission, Washington, DC, May 10. Available at: www.
sec.gov/oiea/investor-alerts-bulletins/ib_crowdfunding-.html.

73

Siegel, B.P., 2013. Title III of the Jobs Act: Using unsophisticated wealth to
crowdfund small business capital or fraudsters’ bank accounts? Hofstra Law
Rev. 41, 777–809.
Sudek, R., 2006. Angel investment criteria. J. Small Bus. Strategy 17, 89.
Tian, X., 2011. The role of venture capital syndication in value creation for
entrepreneurial firms. Rev. Financ. 16, 245–283.
Vismara, S., 2016a. Equity retention and social network theory in equity
crowdfunding. Small Bus. Econ. 46, 579–590.
Vismara, S., 2016b. Information cascades among investors in equity crowdfunding.
Theory Pract, Entrep. in press.
Zhang, K., Chen, X., 2017. Herding in a P2P lending market: Rational inference or
irrational trust? Electron. Commer. Res. Appl. 23, 45–53.
Zhang, J., Liu, P., 2012. Rational herding in microloan markets. Manage. Sci. 58 (5),
892–912.

